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I.  Introduction
This paper presents and tests a model of the interaction between government
policymakers and private investors, aimed at helping to explain why some countries are
able to sustain policies that foster high levels of investment and rapid economic growth,
while others remain at near-subsistence activity levels for long periods of time.  This
question is of particular urgency in Africa, where numerous countries have experienced a
succession of harsh policy regimes inviting little new investment and fostering no
productivity growth. Persistent stagnation seems to be widespread but not inevitable:
since independence at least a dozen African countries have adopted more favorable
policies and experienced real income growth (Rodrik 1998), and variation in growth rates
is greater in Africa than in any other region.
1  In this paper we use the variation in growth
rates within Africa to ask, can African countries’ economic performance be explained in
terms of their governments’ policy choices?  And if so, can those choices be explained as
rational policymakers’ responses to observable conditions?
Our goal is to identify those conditions under which governments are most likely
to adopt and sustain pro-growth regimes.  The first section of the paper presents the
theory, in the form of a political-economy model where policy (taxation and investment
in public goods) and production (private investment) result from an equilibrium between
optimizing policymakers and investors. The second part of the paper presents empirical
results, testing hypotheses derived from the model using data on African levels of
agricultural taxation, agricultural R&D, and economywide growth. Appendices describe
and present the data.
II.  Theory
Empirical studies often find that policy differences account for a large fraction of
cross-country differences in the level and growth rate of per-capita income (e.g. Hall and
Jones 1999, Sachs and Warner 1997).  Such findings beg the question of why some
governments adopt policies that foster growth, while others adopt anti-growth policies—
occasionally imposing such high tax rates, and making such small investments in public
                                                          
1 .  Long-run growth rates for the 1965-95 period across African countries ranged from -2.3 to +5.7 percent,
with a coefficient of variation of 2.7 percent.  The next- highest variability was in East Asia and Latin
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goods, that tax revenues shrink (McMillan 2000) and productivity falls over time
(Fulginiti and Perrin 1997).  It is particularly puzzling to see serial and spatial correlation
in policy choice, as neighboring countries have similar regimes that persist over time
(Easterly and Levine 1998). Instead of learning from experience, it appears that
governments in the same situation consistently implement the same policies.  Why might
otherwise rational policy-makers continue to make seemingly irrational policy choices?
Many analyses of African policy-making focus on social conflict, and the use of
state instruments to enrich favored groups (e.g. Bates 1981).  But over time African
policies have been so destructive to African economies that even politically favored
groups have suffered. Our goal is to help explain how such counter-productive policies
can arise and persist even if policy-makers are well informed. To formulate an intuitively
plausible, politically relevant and empirically testable model of policy formation, we
focus on two specific instruments – output taxation and investment in public goods -- and
treat economic growth as the equilibrium outcome of an infinitely-repeated game between
government officials and the private sector. The model is aimed at specifying a
mechanism through which an optimizing, fully-informed government could consistently
choose to maintain confiscatory taxes and very low R&D investments, despite knowing
that lower tax rates and higher investment levels would yield higher tax revenues over
time.  The mechanism we use generates such a policy failure when producers expect (or
fear) that policymakers will not sustain low tax rates in the future.  Our model builds on
analyses of time-consistency in pricing policies by Besley (1997), McLaren (1996) and
Gilbert and Newbery (1994), adding interaction with public investment in R&D so as to
construct a mechanism whereby policy choice underpins changes in total factor
productivity and economywide growth.
The model’s structure could apply to any sort of economic activity, but our
empirical application is specific to agriculture.  This case is empirically tractable because
of past efforts to collect internationally comparable data on commodity tax rates,
production costs and agricultural R&D. The farm sector looms large in the economywide
performance of low-income countries, where agriculture tends to be the dominant
employer and farmland provides a large fraction of the capital stock.  And public R&D is
a key factor in agricultural productivity growth, as many important technologies are
nonrival, nonexcludable public goods such as the genes embodied in open-pollinated
crops.  Within Africa, Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) find that R&D spending with a six year
lag accounts for between 1.8 and 3.1 percent of agricultural output growth.  Thus,
agricultural R&D as well as economic policy proves to be a major determinant of per-
capita income growth, and although the model itself is quite general a focus on
agriculture is well merited. For simplicity, then, we will henceforth refer to all producers
as farmers, all public goods as agricultural R&D, and all products as crops.
To specify the model, we begin with farmers’ investment and production choices.
We then specify the government’s options, and derive the conditions under which
repeated interactions between optimizing farmers and optimizing policymakers result inAfrica’s Growth Trap page 3
persistent stagnation, and those which sustain high levels of investment and productivity
growth.
Farmers
In the model, farmers choose between remaining at subsistence and producing for
market, where they can earn positive profits but are exposed to taxation.  The total cost of
producing for market, c,  varies across farmers continuously from [ 0, cmax ], representing
variation in distance to market and/or agro-climatic conditions.  These costs can be divided
into sunk costs, s, and harvesting costs, h, which also vary continuously across farmers.
Each farmer chooses qt to maximize the present value of profits or,
















  is the farmer’s discount rate,
Pt
f  is the farmer’s price received at the market,
qt  is the farmer’s investment level (normalized, for example, to one unit of land),
and
γ(rdt-1) is the productivity gain generated by investment in public R&D in the
previous five-year period, determined by its productivity (γ) and the government’s
spending level (rd t-1).
Thus, in a competitive sector where subsistence yields zero profits, farmers plant
as long as the farmgate price covers the total cost of production.
The Government
The government cannot itself undertake production, perhaps because supervision
costs would be prohibitive.  But it does control the marketplace, and is the only provider
of R&D.  The government sets the tax wedge between the price paid to farmers, P
f, and
the price received from consumers which for simplicity (and realism, in a small-country
setting) we assume to be an exogenous world price, P
w.  We assume that policymakers
have an infinite time horizon, and seek to maximize the present discounted value of some
social welfare function which is a weighted sum of tax revenue and producer surplus
given by,
) 2 ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) (
0 00
























t rd dc rd c q c P dc rd c q P P W
ff
γ α γ βAfrica’s Growth Trap page 4
where  β
t
  is the government’s discount rate, and α is the relative weight placed by
policymakers on producer’s surplus relative to tax revenue. To simplify notation, we
define the following terms,
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Optimal policy
In pursuing its objective the government has two policy instruments, the farmgate price
and spending on R&D.  To constrain the policymaker’s problem in a realistic way we rule
out nondistorting lump-sum taxes, and require each year’s spending on R&D to not
exceed the government’s tax revenues. Hence, the government's problem is the following,
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{} ) 5 ( rd )) rd ( 1 )( P ( Q ) P P ( . t . s
























rd , P t
f
t
≥ γ + −




− − − ∑
For well-behaved functions, the optimality condition with respect to rdt is:
[ ] ) 6 ( rd d Z Q P Q ) P P ( d t t 1 t 1 t
* f




1 t λ = α − α + − γ β + + + + + +
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint.  Interpreting, the
optimal level of R&D spending equates the marginal benefit of additional R&D spending
to the marginal cost of additional taxation. If the constraint is binding, then λ>0 and the
distortions associated with raising government funds raise the R&D’s marginal costs,
requiring it to be more productive.
The first order condition with respect to P
f
t is;













P Q P P
dP
dQ
α α λ α λAfrica’s Growth Trap page 5




t is equal to the farmgate price













































Equation 8 implies that in the extreme case in which α=0 and policymakers place
no value on producer surplus, the tax that maximizes their objective function is the
revenue maximizing tax.   As α approaches 1, the government’s optimal tax approaches a
value that depends on λ and ε
s.
2  A feature of the model structure is that the γ terms
cancel, and the welfare maximizing tax is independent of the level of spending on R&D.
But given that tax revenue, if the budget constraint is binding, and α lies between zero
and one, the constraint may justify a tax higher than the otherwise optimal tax.
Equilibrium policy
The equilibrium tax would be the optimal one if it were to affect production
immediately.  But in the context of sunk costs and a delay in farmers’ price response, the
optimal tax would still be an equilibrium only if there were a commitment mechanism by
which government could promise to sustain announced tax rates.  In the absence of such a
commitment mechanism, a government whose value of α  is less than unity may be
tempted to announce low taxes to induce investment, then raise taxes after sunk costs are
incurred to expropriate the resulting economic rent.  Farmers may, with experience, learn
to doubt the government’s announcements, fearing to lose their sunk costs.  Thus
observed investment and tax levels will be part of a repeated game between policymakers
and farmers, whose equilibrium depends on the incentives available in deviation (or
defection) from the optimal (or cooperative) policy.
To specify these incentives, we begin by assuming that farmers have no recourse
against expropriation other than to retreat from the market.  Following Besley (1997), if
government deviates from optimal tax rates, farmers revert to subsistence farming for k
periods.  The length of k could be infinite, if subsistence production never generates
enough surplus to support another experiment in market production, or it could be just
one period.  Given that expropriation of farmers’ sunk costs would lead to k periods of no
new investment, the government’s net gain from expropriation is given by,
                                                          
2 This is because when α=1,Z
'
t/Qtε
s simplifies to dQP
f/dZ and this term evaluated at P
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Equation (9) is derived assuming that the government must continue to pay some
marginal harvesting cost, h, to some farmers for T periods in order to obtain the fruits of
past investment and ht
* is the solution to dW/dh.  Hence the government saves on sunk
costs and R&D.  Implicitly, we assume crop rotation where some new planting occurs
every year, and T represents the length of time over which the crop continues to produce
without having to reinvest in sunk costs.  This ranges from zero for crops that are
replanted every year such as cereals, to several years or decades for long-lived crops such
as coffee and cocoa. Since k represents the number of periods for which output equals
zero because no new planting takes place, after expropriation farmers begin to plant again
in period T+k+1.
For government the value of not deviating from the optimal policy is given by,



















and as long as (10) remains greater than (9) the optimal policy is sustainable.
Conditions for the time-consistency of optimal policy
Subtracting (9) from (10) yields the following condition under which the optimal
policy is a sustainable equilibrium:
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The left-hand side of inequality (11) is the ratio of sunk costs to total costs, weighted by
government’s relative valuation of farm income as opposed to tax revenue.  It thus
represents the government’s short-run gains available in defection away from the low-tax,
high-growth path. The right hand side of inequality (11) is the present discounted value of
the long-run costs of deviating from the high-growth path: once farmers’ profits are
expropriated by high taxation, they revert to subsistence farming for k periods and the
government loses the present discounted value of the foregone tax revenue adjusted for
productivity increases owing to continued spending on R&D.
Equation (11) provides the testable hypotheses of the model. The factor
highlighted in our model that is generally omitted from other analyses is s
*/P
f*, the
observed ratio of sunk to total costs. The higher is this sunk/total cost (STC) ratio, the
greater is the government’s incentive to undertake predatory taxation after investmentAfrica’s Growth Trap page 7
occurs.  The STC ratio is largely a physical characteristic of production technology, and is
relatively high for perennials and production systems requiring a heavy up-front
investment in irrigation or field preparation. African countries tend to have a comparative
advantage in these products, particularly tree crops, perhaps because the African
environment, like the tropics more generally, offers less of a concentrated summer
growing season with less available moisture and generally poorer soils than temperate
regions.  By favoring crops requiring heavy preharvest investment, the physical
environment itself can be said to make farmers relatively more vulnerable to predatory
taxation, thus inhibiting growth unless governments can commit to low-tax/high R&D
policies.
Two other variables, α and β, formalize the role of political conditions that are
often discussed in previous studies: α reflects the degree to which the government is
representative of farmers as opposed to those who benefit from tax revenue, and β reflects
the degree to which the government is impatient and discounts future tax revenues. For
example, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that poor policies could be due to the limited
political accountability associated with nondemocratic traditions, as would be captured by
the parameter α .  Similarly, Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that African countries’
poor policy choices may be due to their internal ethnolinguistic divisions and frequent
political conflict, hence high discount rates as captured by parameter β.
The remaining two variables, expected future world prices and the productivity of
R&D, have also been said to differ systematically between Africa and the rest of the
world.  Deteriorations in the terms of trade may be as frequent as improvements, and the
relatively low historical levels of R&D investment in Africa make it hard to identify its
payoff.  But recent projections of Africa’s terms of trade (Hertel et al. 1998) suggest
continued high demand for African farm products, and studies of the productivity of
African agricultural research suggest that it is at least as productive as research elsewhere
(Masters et al., 1999).
Consequences of agricultural policy for economywide growth
The political-economy model described above provides testable predictions about
which countries will adopt what policies.  To generate predictions as to the consequences
of those policies for the economy as a whole we need to control for other major
determinants of growth.  Following the conditional-convergence approach to empirical
growth of Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), we assume that our
agricultural sector is embedded in a Cobb-Douglas aggregate economy for which growth
is a transitional process from its randomly determined initial income (y0) to its steady-
state potential income (y
ss) determined by resource endowments and their productivity,
and the time path of income follows:Africa’s Growth Trap page 8
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where b is the speed of convergence to the steady-state.  In this context, growth will be
faster for countries with lower levels of initial income or higher levels of steady-state
income.   Differentiating (12) with respect to time we obtain the following:
) 13 ( 0 ,
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In the cross-country empirical implementation, we first ask whether policy choices
are in fact correlated with material conditions as predicted by equation (11) – looking
particularly for an effect of cross-country differences in the STC ratio when controlling
for differences in other factors that influence policy. Then, we ask whether our measures
of agricultural taxation and R&D investment are significant correlates of growth, raising
the steady state income level in equation (13) controlling for its other possible
determinants.
III.  Empirical Application
Equation (11) is a condition for sustaining optimal policy.  The model predicts that,
if condition (11) is met, we will observe low taxes, high investment, and high rates of
economic growth.  If the condition is not met we expect to observe high taxes and low
investment associated with the Nash equilibrium growth trap.  Specifically, the model
suggests that the low-tax, high-growth equilibrium will be harder to sustain: (a) the larger
the share of sunk costs in total costs, (b) the smaller are expected future profits from a
particular investment, (c) the greater the government’s discount factor and, (d) the lower is
expected future productivity of R&D spending.  In deriving our estimating equations we
will avoid needing to measure α, the weight on producer surplus, which we will treat as an
unobservable variable taking on country-specific values.
To simplify notation, we rename each of the variables we are interested in testing.




T+1).  It is expressed as a function of T and k to remind us that its
value will depend on the length of punishment, k and on the type of crop, T, as well as on
the pure time-preference factor β.  The expected future profit margin is PROF
e . The
expected productivity of R&D spending is R&D
e. Rewriting equation (11) with the new
variable names gives the following condition for sustaining the "high-growth" equilibrium,
) 14 ( ) & ( ) , ( ) 1 (
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Our empirical strategy is to construct a direct test of the model followed by a variety of
alternative formulations and robustness tests. Taken literally, the model implies thatAfrica’s Growth Trap page 9
countries make discrete jumps from one regime to the other.  Thus the direct test requires us
to classify countries in terms of whether the observed tax rate is higher than the optimal tax
implied by equation (8).  In the absence of information on α, we classify as high-tax only
those governments whose tax rates exceed the revenue-maximizing tax, computed using
long-run elasticities following McMillan (2000).   This is the highest tax that any
government might consider optimal, as a lower rate would increase revenues for both
government and producers.This model-based classification of tax regime differs
substantially from the prespecified cutoffs used in other studies to differentiate between
favorable and unfavorable policy environments, such as the 30 percent tax rate used by
Jaeger (1992). We also classify countries into low- and high-growth regimes, based on
whether per-capita growth rates were negative or positive.
Using the regime classifications we conduct a direct test of the model, asking
whether the variables in inequality (14) are statistically relevant predictors of regime type in
a probit specification.  The advantage of taking the model literally in this way is that, if it
were the true model, these parameter estimates would be precise.  But we also wish to test
the robustness of our observed correlations to alternative model specifications.  In
particular, we would like to use the tax and growth variables in a continuous OLS
specification, to retain any information implicit in the magnitude of these variables, and to
ensure that our results are directly comparable to others’ work in the empirical-growth
literature.  The relevant estimating equations are derived below, first for the limited-
dependent-variable probit specification and then for the linear OLS regression.
The limited dependent variable model
Up to this point, we have ignored α, the government’s weight on producer surplus.
We expect it to vary from country to country so we give it a subscript, αi.  The net benefit of
a low-tax policy, yi
*, depends on this unobserved variable,
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What we observe is only which policy regime prevails, corresponding to the sign of
(15): the dependent variable yi is set equal to one if a low-tax regime prevails and zero



















Thus, the probability that a low-tax/high-growth regime prevails is,
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Estimating this equation requires an assumption about the distribution of 1-αi.  Recall that
the unobserved variable, αI, is the weight that the government places on producer surplus
relative to its own. Hence, it lies between negative infinity and one and is likely to be
grouped between zero and one.  It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of 1-αi is log
normal with mean µ and variance σ 
2. Hence,
) 18 ( . )] / ) & ( ) , ( (log(
1
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation one, and µ and σ account for the fact that log(1-αi) may have a normal
distribution with a mean other than zero and variance not equal to one.  Rewriting equation
(18) in log-linear form yields the following estimating equation
3:
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Linear models
For OLS estimation we use inequality (14) informally, as a guide to the variables
that might be important in determining policy levels rather than regime type.  Here our
dependent variables are the original continuous measures of taxation and spending on
research and development in agriculture. Specifically, we estimate the following two
equations:
) 20 ( ) , ( 3 2 1 0 a k T PROF STC constant taxation it
e
it it it ε δ β β β β + + + + =
) 20 ( ) , ( 3 2 1 0 b k T PROF STC constant rd it
e
it it it ε δ β β β β + + + + =
Then, to evaluate consequences of these policies for growth, we use equation (13) to
generate the following estimating equation:
) 21 ( income state steady of ts determinan 2 1 0 it it income initial constant growth ε β β β + + + =
Data
Details of the data used, along with summary statistics for the entire data set and
also for each estimation sample, are provided in the data appendix.  The unpublished data
on research and development expenditures for 19 African countries over the period 1961-
1991 are provided in appendix Table 7. Key features of the time period and sample sizes
are summarized here.
Our measure of initial income is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity
dollars in 1965, from the Penn World Tables version 5.6.  Growth is measured as the
average annual change in the natural logarithm of GDP per capita between 1965 and
                                                          
3 Note that two testable restrictions on these coefficients, namely γ 0 = 0 and γ1 = γ2  = - γ3  are implied by the
model but rejected in it is empirical application with the available data.Africa’s Growth Trap page 11
1990.  Agricultural R&D is measured in real per-capita terms, and is derived from the
work of Pardey et al. (1998).  R&D expenditures are available on an annual basis for a
total of 19 countries over a period of 30 years, 1961-1991.  Agricultural taxation is
measured in the product markets as one minus the nominal protection coefficient (NPC),
the farmgate to border price ratio, as a measure of the divergence between what farmers
could get if they sold their product directly to world markets and what they actually get
due to government intervention. These data are derived from the work of Jaeger (1992),
extended by McMillan (2000), and are available for a total of 56 crops and 32 countries
for various years.  For the cross-country regressions, the crop specific variables (eg tax
rates and ratios of sunk to total costs) are aggregated up to national levels using
production weights.   All of these variables are computed annually, then averaged up to
four sub-periods, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84 and 1985-89 to take account of variation in
world commodity prices and economic conditions.
4 Statistical tests are performed both
for the individual sub-periods and then for the pooled data.
VI.  Results
Tables 1 and 2 reports estimation of equation (19) using standard probit techniques,
first for the tax regime and then for the growth regime as the dependent variable.  Each
column uses a different measure for the government's discount factor, starting with the
measure developed by McMillan (2000) and then testing the major variables for political
conditions reported in the Barro-Lee data set.
The signs of the estimated coefficients on all explanatory variables are as
predicted by our model in all regressions, although the political variables are statistically
significant in only three of the eight regressions. In the tax-regime regressions of Table 1,
the STC ratio is by far the most strongly significant regressor; in the growth-regime
regressions of Table 2, it is the net profitability variable.  From Table 1, countries whose
production systems require higher levels of sunk costs are more likely to have
confiscatory agricultural tax regimes, and also to not grow – this is consistent with the
model, as it is the taxation of these sunk costs which might tempt the government into
deviation from the optimal policy.  From Table 2, countries whose agricultural production
is very profitable are particularly likely to experience growth, and also to have low tax
regimes.  Again this is consistent with the model, as it is the pursuit of these expected
profits which induces the government to sustain the optimal policy.
Tables 3 and 4 report regression results for equations (20a) and (20b) respectively.
The signs of the estimated coefficients are again as expected, and here the political variables
are significant in five of the eight regressions.  Although there is a much smaller sample size
for regressions explaining R&D, significance levels are similar for the two dependent
variables.  In this context the magnitudes of the coefficients can be interpreted directly, and
                                                          
4 These sub-periods are similar to the sub-periods used by Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1993) in a
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the importance of the STC ratio is clearly visible in the results.  Table 5 reports results for
growth rates in a comparable way, revealing that a ten percent higher STC ratio is
associated with a one percent lower growth rate.
Tables 6 and 7 report regressions estimating equation (21), using a cross section of
the long-run data and then a panel of the five-year averages.  The first column of both tables
establishes the correlation between growth rates and our two agricultural policy instruments
(taxation and R&D) plus their interaction.  In both cases the predicted correlations are
strong and significant.  The Table 6 formulation permits us to include controls for three
economywide policy measures that have achieved prominence in the empirical-growth
literature:  aggregate government savings as a measure of fiscal prudence, the openness of
policy to foreign trade as a measure of rent-seeking and distortions in the external sector,
and the quality of institutions as a measure of rent-seeking and distortions in the domestic
sector.   None of these controls has much influence on the results.  Adjusted R-square
values are high and unchanged, and coefficients are uniformly large and significantly
different from zero—except for the taxation variable when controlling for the external
openness, which may be due to similarities in the types of policies these two variables pick
up.  In any case, R&D levels remain a highly significant correlate of growth and long-run
productivity, confirming the association between R&D and economywide growth in this
context.
Table 7 provides the same regressions using panel data, allowing controls for
unobservable influences on growth rates in particular countries or time periods.  Column (1)
gives results without controls for any such fixed effects.  Column (2) allows for period-
specific fixed effects, column (3) checks for both period- and country fixed effects, and
column (4) drops the initial-income variable which, as a lagged value of the dependent
variable could bias the panel results.  As before the correlations between R&D and taxation
with growth are highly robust to these controls.   Results for each variable are similar to
those using the long-run growth data in Table 6, although model R-square values are lower
due to the presence of business cycles, terms of trade shocks, weather disturbances and
other noise.
Finally, to provide results that are fully comparable to many other studies and
provide a different sort of robustness test,  Table 8 presents regressions that use our
agricultural-policy measures as controls in a standard growth-accounting context.  The first
column of Table 8 takes the growth-accounting specification identified as empirically
important on a worldwide basis by Sachs and Warner (1997), and replicates it for our
within-Africa sample.  Columns 2 and 3 do the same, discarding the variables which lose
their significance in this context, for both the resticted Sachs-Warner sample and the larger
sample for which the data are available.  Columns 3a, 3b and 3c then add three alternative
measures of taxation, and columns 3a’, 3b’ and 3c’ do so with the R&D variable as well.
Results are consistent across all three taxation measures: Columns 3a and 3a’ use the
dummy variable constructed by Deaton and Miller (1995) to indicate whether a country paid
producers a relatively high proportion of the world price during the period 1970-1975,Africa’s Growth Trap page 13
constructed using a weighted average of the country's most important exports. Columns 3b
and 3b’ use a similar dummy constructed by McMillan (2000) covering the period 1970-
1979.  Columns 3c and 3c’ use the same continuous measure as in the previous tables,
namely the average nominal protection coefficient, or ratio of domestic producer price to
world price.  Once again the R&D variable overshadows tax policy as a correlate of growth.
This may be because its effect is stronger, but it could also be due to other factors such as
having less measurement error than the tax variable.
IV. Conclusions
This paper presents and tests a model of policy choice aimed at explaining why so
many (but not all) African governments adopt self-defeating predatory policies towards
the private sector, when pro-growth reforms would yield greater incomes for both
government and the private sector.
The theory is a political-economy model in which the government sets the level of
taxation and R&D in a strategic game with domestic producers who produce output. One
equilibrium has the government commit to low taxes with investment in R&D, so as to
elicit high and growing levels of production. Another possible equilibrium involves high
tax rates and no investment, to which the economy responds with low and stagnant levels
of production and perhaps a retreat to subsistence.
Without an institutional mechanism for commitment to a particular strategy, the
government can credibly be expected by farmers to sustain high-growth policies only if
material conditions make it consistently in government’s favor to do so.  This requires
that the sector’s share of sunk costs in total costs be relatively small (yielding a low
potential payoff to exploitation by a rent-seeking government), the government's discount
rate be relatively low (leading to a high value on the future costs of exploitation in the
present), high expected future profitability and high relative weight on farmers’ as
opposed to government’s own income.
Empirical tests of these hypotheses find considerable support for the model,
particularly for the relevance of the sunk-to-total-cost ratio in determining policy choice.
Our preliminary conclusion is that one factor contributing to African economic
performance could be that African policy-makers are trapped in a low-growth equilibrium
of opportunistic policies and low investment, induced by high levels of sunk costs in the
production system. Changes in technology or institutions that enable producers to escape
taxation or retaliate against it, as well as changes enabling governments to make credible
pro-growth commitments, are thus likely to have a high payoff in promoting a more
favorable policy environment.Africa’s Growth Trap page 14
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Table 1.
Tax Regime Modeled as Probit Specification
Dependent variable:  =1 if tax<revenue-maximizing tax and 0 otherwise
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sunk-to-Total-Cost ratio -4.72 -9.01 -8.81 -6.01
(1.56)*** (3.07)*** (3.11)*** (1.81)***
Net profitability  0.53 0.74 0.67 0.27
(0.38) (0.33)** (0.31) (0.26)








No. of obs. 128 62 62 84
Likelihood Ratio Test 19.94 8.86 9.81 14.22
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix.Likelihood ratio tests are for the null hypothesis that
the coefficients excluding the constant term are jointly zero for each model. Under the  null,
the test statistic is distributed as Chi-2(3). The null is rejected for values greater than 7.8 at
the 5% level.Africa’s Growth Trap page 17
Table 2.
Growth Regime Modeled as Probit Specification
Dependent variable:  =1 if growth>0 and 0 otherwise
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sunk-to-Total-Cost ratio -7.06 -3.12 -3.01 -3.18
(3.70)*** (2.65) (2.68) (1.96)*
Net profitability 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.72
(0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.23)*** (0.19)***








No. of obs. 96 56 56 76
Likelihood Ratio Test 20.97 14.09 13.47 16.88
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix. Likelihood ratio tests are for the null hypothesis
that the coefficients excluding the constant term are jointly zero for each model. Under the
null, the test statistic is distributed as Chi-2(3). The null is rejected for values greater than
7.8 at the 5% level.Africa’s Growth Trap page 18
Table 3.
Tax Level Modeled as Linear OLS
Dependent variable:  average nominal protection coefficient by crop & period, 1965-90
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sunk-to-Total-Cost ratio -2.01 -1.65 -1.65 -1.59 -1.93
(.362)*** (.483)*** (.398)*** (.407)*** (.463)***
Net profitability -.032 -.036 -.023 -.020 -.024
(.010)*** (.010)*** (.016) (.016) (.016)








Constant 2.24 1.92 1.91 1.84 2.41
(.275)*** (.395)*** (.294)*** (.289)*** (.379)***
No. of obs. 128 128 62 62 84
Adj. R
2 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.27
Root MSE .265 .263 .216 .218 .267
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix.Africa’s Growth Trap page 19
Table 4.
Agricultural R&D Level Modeled as Linear OLS
Dependent variable:  average per capita agricultural R&D levels by country & period, 1965-90
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sunk-to-Total-Cost ratio -.015 -.016 -.019 -.015 -.016
(.004)*** (.007)** (.004)*** (.005)** (.004)***
Net profitability .0004 .0004 .0005 .0005 .0004
(.0002)** (.0002)* (.0001)*** (.0002)** (.0002)**








Constant .014 .014 ..017 .013 .020
(.003)*** (.006)** (.002)*** (.004) (.002)***
No. of obs. 44 44 32 32 44
Adj. R
2 .26 .24 .51 .28 .39
Root MSE .002 .002 .002 .002 .002
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix.Africa’s Growth Trap page 20
Table 5.
GDP Growth Level Modeled as Linear OLS
Dependent variable:  five year average annual growth, 1965-90
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sunk-to-Total-Cost ratio -.113 -.113 -.102 -.101 -.088
(.004)*** (.004)*** (.061)*** (.044)*** (.051)***
Net profitability .004 .004 .003 .003 .003
(.001)** (.001)** (.001)*** (.001)** (.001)**








Constant .014 .014 .017 .013 .020
(.003)*** (.006)** (.002)*** (.004) (.002)***
No. of obs. 95 95 56 56 75
Adj. R
2 .26 .24 .51 .28 .39
Root MSE .002 .002 .002 .002 .002
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix.Africa’s Growth Trap page 21
Table 6.
GDP Growth on Policy using Long-Run Data
Dependent variable:  average annual growth of real per capita GDP, 1965-90
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial income -3.96 -3.11 -3.92 -3.32
(.954)*** (1.05)** (1.17)*** (1.37**
R&D 3.03 2.35 2.72 3.05
(.646)*** (.687)*** (.773)*** (.786)***
taxation 6.28 6.31 2.84 12.9
(1.62)*** (1.74)*** (3.64) (6.85)*
R&D x taxation 1.18 1.11 .562 2.21











No. of obs. 19 19 18 15
Adj. R
2 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.60
Root MSE 1.098 1.039 1.15 1.18
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix.Africa’s Growth Trap page 22
Table 7.
GDP Growth on Policy using Panel Data
Dependent variable:  growth of real per capita GDP by five-year period, 1965-90
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial income -.042 -.038 -.126
(.016)** (.015)*** (.029)***
R&D .030 .031 .057 .039
(.009)*** (.008)*** (.012)*** (.009)***
taxation .094 .118 .079 .151
(.040)** (.031)*** (.041)** (.046)***
R&D x taxation .015 .019 .012 .022
(.007)** (.005)*** (.007)** (.007)***




No. of obs. 93 93 93 93
Adj. R
2 0.23 0.31 0.64 0.46
Root MSE .038 .030 .035 .037
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix.Africa’s Growth Trap page 23
Table 8.
GDP Growth on Policy in a Growth-Accounting Model
Dependent variable:Growth of per capita ppp-adjusted GDP, 1965-90




Initial Income 1965 -1.76 -1.19 -1.08 -1.47 -1.48 -1.53 -2.24 -2.02 -2.12
Conditions (.471)*** (.331)*** (.452)***(.254)***(.295)***(.429)***(.309)***(.332)***(.526)***










Demography 4.21 2.73 2.03 1.28 1.82 2.21 1.39 1.48 4.14
(1.536)***(1.142)***(.861)***(.612)***(.778)***(1.503) (1.139) (1.243) (2.168)
Open*initial -4.09
(6.932)
Taxation -0.76 -0.73 2.34 -0.49 -0.02 1.15
(.361)** (.372)** (1.059)**(.557) (.013) (.982)







2 0.76 0.76 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.44 0.78 0.76 0.39
No. of
Countries
23 23 34 34 34 25 19 19 12
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  Significance levels
are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).   Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for all
variables provided in the data appendix.Columns denoted a, b and c use different measures
of taxation, and the signs of the measure in a and b is opposite to that of  c.Africa’s Growth Trap page 24
Data Appendix. Definition and Description of All Variables
Growth
Average annual change in real GDP per person from 1965 to 1990, from Sachs and
Warner (1997). GDP data are from the Penn World Tables 5.6, and population data are
from the World Bank’s WorldData CD-ROM (1995).
Initial income
Log of real GDP per economically active person in 1965, from Sachs and Warner
(1997), using GDP from Penn World Tables 5.6 and economically active population
(defined as the population between the ages of 15-64) from the World Bank (1995).
Agricultural R&D
Log of average annual real R&D expenditure per capita in agriculture, from Pardey,
Alston and Roseboom (1998).  R&D expenditures include spending on personnel, operating
expenses and capital expenditures in research and development for crops, livestock, forestry
and fisheries, by public and semi-public agencies.
Agricultural taxation
Data on taxation of export crops in Sub-Saharan Africa were obtained from Jaeger
for data through 1987, and updated to 1995 for the World Bank (Jaeger 1991, McMillan
2000). Jaeger uses the same methodology to estimate nominal protection coefficients
(NPCs) used in Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988,1983) and recommended by Westlake
(1987). And, where the country crop combinations are the same, Jaeger's estimates are
practically identical to those reported in Krueger et al (1988,1993). All three of these studies
point to the importance of properly adjusting international reference prices to reflect value-
added and transport costs. Previous studies often looked only at the ratio of the farmgate
price to the world price without accounting for processing and transport costs and hence
grossly overestimated the rates of taxation. A better estimate of the level of taxation is the
ratio of the farmgate price to the border price adjusted for transport and processing costs and
is a measure of the divergence between what farmers could get if they sold their product
directly to world markets and what they actually get due to government intervention. The
tax rate is then one minus the NPC.
Calculation of the nominal protection coefficient requires data on prices paid to
farmers, world prices, and an estimate of any value added to the crop between the time of
pickup from farmers and export. Several sources including the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Bank now publishes data on
prices paid to farmers and world prices. However, to estimate the true nominal protection
coefficient, one must convert these farmgate prices into their equivalent in terms of the
processed good and adjust the world price for transport and marketing costs.
For example, in 1986 farmers in Madagascar received the equivalent of $0.89/kg. of
dry robusta coffee cherries. The world price for roasted robusta coffee beans was $2.57/kg.Africa’s Growth Trap page 25
Since 1 kg. of roasted coffee equals approximately 1.32 kgs. of dry cherries and because the
world price is for dry cherries, first the farmgate price is converted to its international
equivalent by multiplying .89 by 1.32 to get $1.17 per kg. We now adjust the world price
for transport and processing charges by subtracting .27 per kg. and .10 per kg. to get $2.20
per kg. Hence, the NPC is 0.53 and the corresponding tax rate is 47%. Details of the
conversion factors, transport costs, processing margins, and freight charges used by Jaeger
are published  in McMillan 2000.
Government Savings
Average central government surplus or deficit as a percent of GDP, 1970-90, as
used by Sachs and Warner (1997) from World Bank (1995).
Openness (Sachs-Warner index)
The fraction of years during the period 1965-90 in which the country meets all of the
following criteria:  (a) nontariff barriers apply to less than 40 percent of trade, (b) average
tariffs are less than 40 percent, (c) the black market foreign exchange premium was less
than 20 percent, (d) the country is not classified as socialist and (e) major exports are not
subject to monopoly trading, from Sachs and Warner (1997).
Institutional Quality (ICRG index)
Average rating for the rule of law, the quality of bureaucracy, the prevalence of
government corruption, the risk of expropriation, and the repudiation of contracts by
government.  This index was used by Sachs and Warner (1997) and originally constructed
by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) from data printed in
the International Country Risk Guide published by Political Risk Services.
Sunk-to-Total-Cost ratio
Computed from cost-of-production estimates for various crop years, as one minus
the ratio of harvest cost to total cost from data and sources in McMillan (2000), appendix A.
Net profitability
Computed from data reported in McMillan (2000), and follows the recommendation
of Deaton and Miller (1995) by estimating the expected future profit margin by taking an
average of actual profits over the twenty-year period, 1970-1989.
Imputed discount rate
Defined as δ (T,k) = (β
T+1-β
T+k+1)/(1-β
T+1), where β is one minus one over the mean
time in power for each country since the time of independence at each point in time, or the
retrospective hazard rate for the probability that the present government will remain in
power.  For example, when Jerry Rawlings came to power in Ghana in 1981, the mean time
in office for his predecessors was 3.14 years, so the probability that he would remain in
power the following year was 31.45 percent.  The imputed discount rate for government
policy is this political discount rate, β, plus the time value of money at five percent per year.Africa’s Growth Trap page 26
Revenue Maximizing Tax Rates
Computed as one over one plus the elasticity of supply, the tax rate that maximizes
total revenue. Elasticities of supply were obtained for each crop from a number of sources
and are reported in McMillan (2000).
Political instability
Average over 1960-90 of the five-year averages reported by Barro and Lee.
Frequency of revolutions
Average over 1960-90 of the five-year averages reported by Barro and Lee.
Political rights
Average over 1960-90 of the five-year averages reported by Barro and Lee.
Variables used only in Table 8 (all from Sachs and Warner 1997)
Life Expectancy




Average annual growth of economically active population, minus average annual
growth in the total population, for 1965-90.
Tropics
Fraction of land area subject to tropical climate
Access
Dummy variable set to 1 for landlocked countries.Africa’s Growth Trap page 27








Minimum Maximum Number of
Obs.
Sub-Saharan
Africa 2.66 0.67 1.78 -2.37 5.71 32
East
Asia 0.42 4.96 2.06 1.39 7.41 8
South
Asia 0.39 1.71 0.67 0.76 2.30 4
Latin
America 1.66 0.86 1.43 -2.24 3.22 22
North Africa
& Middle E. 0.46 2.14 .98 -0.01 2.92 7
OECD 0.33 2.66 0.87 0.97 4.66 22
Tropics 1.56 1.28 2.02 -2.37 7.39 63
Temperate 0.56 2.53 1.41 -0.25 7.41 32







Minimum Maximum Number of
Obs.
Sub-Saharan
Africa 4.00 1.09 4.01 -8.02 17.09 238
East
Asia 0.75 5.73 3.35 -3.74 13.31 84
South
Asia 1.13 2.16 2.44 -2.07 7.75 33
Latin
America 1.50 1.54 3.33 -7.39 9.92 135
North Africa
& Middle E. 1.33 3.46 4.35 -8.56 14.63 61
OECD 0.67 3.18 2.15 -1.45 13.12 150
Tropics 2.00 1.99 3.91 -8.56 17.09 524
Temperate 1.00 3.17 2.89 -4.95 14.63 178
1/Coefficient of Variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the absolute value of the mean.Africa’s Growth Trap page 28






avnpc 229 .6767717 .3165598 .015 1.986667
dscount 128 11.2202 7.89539 2.030303 23.99999
stc 128 .753125 .070563 .59 .87
netprof 128 2.377262 1.789646 0 11.33113
revol 171 .2083626 .3034599 0 1.8
pinstab 170 .111 .1563021 0 .93
prights 172 5.674593 1.325708 2 7
growth 99 .0079344 .0390853 -.0801642 .1709199
Correlation matrix for values used in estimation sample
 avnpc dscount stc netprof revol pinstab prights
avnpc 1.0000
dscount 0.3584 1.0000
stc -0.4847 -0.7405 1.0000
netprof -0.1558 0.1167 0.0680 1.0000
revol -0.0979 -0.0940 -0.0143 -0.1976 1.0000
pinstab -0.0945 -0.0845 -0.0280 -0.2058 0.9977 1.0000
prights -0.2629 -0.1213 0.2681 -0.0754 0.1704 0.1634 1.0000
growth 0.1154 0.2022 -0.1639 0.1416 -0.3008 -0.2999 0.0653
Note: n= 62Africa’s Growth Trap page 29







avnpc 229 .6767717 .3165598 .015 1.986667
dscount 128 11.2202 7.89539 2.030303 23.99999
stc 128 .753125 .070563 .59 .87
netprof 128 2.377262 1.789646 0 11.33113
coup 180 .0498333 .1110864 0 .67
pinstab 170 .111 .1563021 0 .93
prights 172 5.674593 1.325708 2 7
Estimation Sample
avnpc 128 .6489518 .3039305 .015 1.986667
dscount 128 11.2202 7.89539 2.030303 23.99999
stc 128 .753125 .070563 .59 .87
netprof 128 2.377262 1.789646 0 11.33113
coup 62 .0537097 .1206435 0 .67
pinstab 62 .13 .1845775 0 .93
prights 84 5.750833 1.192303 2 7
s a m p l e 3 1 2 8 1011
Correlation matrix for values used in estimation sample
avnpc stc netprof dscount pinstab coup prights
avnpc 1.0000
stc -0.4677 1.0000
netprof -0.1932 0.0092 1.0000
dscount 0.3356 -0.5911 0.1423 1.0000
pinstab -0.0945 -0.0280 -0.2058 -0.0845 1.0000
coup -0.1599 0.2193 -0.0669 -0.3486 0.4285 1.0000
prights -0.3035 0.2801 -0.0664 -0.1488 0.1634 0.1782 1.0000
Note: n= 128 for all variables except for pinstab and coup (n=62) and prights (n=84).Africa’s Growth Trap page 30






All Observations  (as for Table A3, except for R&D variable)
rdagpop 114 .0063981 .0076084 .0001145 .0410093
Estimation Sample
dscount 44 12.61891 8.498812 2.030303 23.99999
rdagpop 44 .003885 .002411 .0003956 .0082399
stc 44 .7372727 .0820766 .62 .87
netprof 44 2.622037 1.355139 .5868784 7.17088
coup 32 .0625 .1428737 0 .67
pinstab 32 .13625 .2020021 0 .93
prights 44 5.603182 1.016942 3 7
sample4 44 1 0 1 1
Correlation matrix for values used in estimation sample
rdagpop stc netprof dscount pinstab coup prights
rdagpop 1.0000
stc -0.4950 1.0000
netprof 0.1599 0.1179 1.0000
dscount 0.4203 -0.8078 0.0196 1.0000
pinstab -0.4354 -0.1284 -0.0195 0.0097 1.0000
coup -0.3409 0.3151 0.0587 -0.4023 0.3236 1.0000
prights -0.3474 -0.0720 -0.0429 0.1993 0.1159 0.1232 1.0000
Note: n= 44 for all variables except coup and pinstab (n=32).Africa’s Growth Trap page 31







growth 42 .7288095 1.808697 -2.37 5.71
lnrd 19 -5.417179 .9748949 -7.35845 -3.495169
lnnpc 35 -.3651439 .4173538 -1.203973 .7419373
initial 42 7.3 .5698352 6.32
8.72
open 39 .0661538 .1775656 0
1
instqual 31 4.538065 1.196786 2.73
7
govsav 35 4.135143 5.252771 -3.34
20.86
Estimation Sample
growth 19 .921579 1.914832 -1.99 5.71
lnrd 19 -5.417179 .9748949 -7.35845 -3.495169
lnnpc 19 -.2322986 .4571469 -1.203973 .7419373
initial 19 7.345263 .666503 6.32 8.72
open 18 .0983333 .2508398 0 1
instqual 15 4.877333 1.303481 2.73 7
govsav 19 3.327368 5.330188 -3.34 20.86
Correlation matrix for values used in estimation sample
growth initial lnrd lnnpc govsav open instqual
growth 1.0000
initial -0.1688 1.0000
lnrd 0.3316 0.8114 1.0000
lnnpc 0.4363 0.2266 0.5083 1.0000
govsav 0.6182 -0.1529 0.1850 0.0276 1.0000
open 0.4679 0.4255 0.5358 0.5512 0.1545 1.0000
instqual 0.3680 0.3229 0.5096 -0.2409 0.4674 0.3188 1.0000
Note: n=19 for all variables except open (n=18) and instqual (n=15).Africa’s Growth Trap page 32







growth 238 .011335 .0399167 -.0801642 .1709199
initial 254 6.72006 .6059545 5.517453 8.668712
lnnpc 229 -.5272161 .6213797 -4.199705 .6864582
lnrd 114 -5.594466 1.090045 -9.075287 -3.193956
Estimation Sample
growth 93 .0131501 .0425218 -.0688716 .1709199
initial 93 6.752922 .5770551 5.517453 8.267449
lnnpc 93 -.5268534 .8419937 -4.199705 .6864582
lnrd 93 -5.694964 1.019065 -9.075287 -3.273539




lnrd 0.8214 0.1912 1.0000
Note: n= 93Africa’s Growth Trap page 33
Appendix Table A.7
Total agricultural research expenditures (million 1985 PPP dollars)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Botswana 0.182 0.289 0.406 0.532 0.668 1.136 1.374 1.565 1.603 2.543
Burkina Faso 1.613 1.580 1.805 1.819 2.186 2.483 2.494 2.553 2.835 3.687
Cote d'Ivoire 18.038 20.925 22.994 24.848 26.067 28.059 28.028 27.614 29.921 30.497
Ethiopia 1.900 2.420 2.680 3.300 3.858 4.750 6.359 10.337 8.723 9.087
Ghana 12.152 12.607 13.368 14.484 16.209 16.161 16.598 17.237 18.439 20.001
Kenya 22.364 23.387 24.341 25.914 25.680 31.625 35.533 35.943 40.914 41.731
Lesotho 0.248 0.372 0.495 0.619 0.743 0.743 0.954 1.171 1.392 1.620
Madagascar 17.889 19.451 22.840 22.725 27.060 25.691 26.817 28.154 29.138 27.711
Malawi 8.114 8.623 9.082 9.542 10.513 10.666 14.442 18.225 18.259 17.880
Mauritius 3.200 3.501 3.802 4.103 4.680 5.072 5.555 6.020 6.467 6.898
Niger 1.993 2.249 2.505 2.761 3.017 3.324 3.529 3.785 4.041 4.336
Nigeria 42.151 58.252 59.201 64.828 88.667 87.347 83.379 82.652 86.555 82.661
Rwanda 1.969 2.363 2.757 3.151 3.545 3.938 3.876 3.813 3.751 3.688
Senegal 17.819 17.819 18.231 18.638 19.059 19.494 19.944 20.411 20.896 21.423
South Africa 75.490 82.394 84.519 94.046 103.104 109.037 110.184 115.180 116.274 126.077
Sudan 12.992 13.475 16.998 19.368 19.479 23.793 23.875 24.168 25.981 32.533
Swaziland 1.052 1.239 1.441 1.657 1.889 2.139 2.611 2.372 2.135 1.898
Zambia 4.379 4.850 5.453 5.388 7.234 8.936 10.357 10.968 11.331 12.676
Zimbabwe 13.609 14.718 15.827 16.936 17.304 20.470 20.588 19.975 20.338 25.197
Total (19) 257.153 290.514 308.743 334.658 380.958 404.862 416.497 432.144 448.993 472.142
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Botswana 2.673 2.960 3.542 5.432 3.276 4.060 4.499 6.026 6.790 9.795
Burkina Faso 2.851 3.613 3.921 4.122 4.573 5.045 5.600 6.085 6.690 6.964
Cote d'Ivoire 34.690 35.765 35.041 33.770 34.856 34.982 34.395 37.459 38.695 36.939
Ethiopia 9.194 11.941 10.820 14.079 11.998 15.518 15.603 17.260 17.916 18.968
Ghana 17.915 20.577 21.401 22.080 20.440 21.363 20.886 20.490 17.682 14.340
Kenya 49.689 59.096 59.838 51.172 53.045 53.051 56.073 65.884 66.427 57.673
Lesotho 1.852 2.101 2.542 2.485 2.629 2.764 2.890 3.008 3.118 3.375
Madagascar 29.279 30.171 28.885 17.649 16.094 17.663 16.466 18.632 18.152 16.008
Malawi 17.360 21.054 20.564 18.436 17.527 18.370 18.178 22.911 20.918 26.475
Mauritius 7.589 7.752 7.796 7.844 7.750 7.515 8.115 8.231 8.354 8.521
Niger 4.308 5.129 2.850 3.017 3.087 6.003 8.952 9.693 10.652 9.693
Nigeria 92.074 111.534 132.060 126.266 180.647 209.383 240.957 169.264 164.057 177.753
Rwanda 3.626 3.407 3.188 2.969 2.750 3.160 4.372 4.837 5.275 5.458
Senegal 25.478 22.648 23.449 24.997 29.063 33.132 33.290 35.006 32.608 31.742
South Africa 137.950 127.475 113.764 119.294 129.596 123.118 130.210 131.300 110.858 110.538
Sudan 34.936 38.176 38.290 37.643 36.587 36.156 35.503 32.413 29.613 49.402
Swaziland 2.867 2.660 2.453 2.246 2.039 1.832 2.488 2.866 1.692 1.787
Zambia 17.688 15.915 14.412 14.203 17.220 18.653 18.333 18.093 17.475 19.358
Zimbabwe 26.434 27.876 29.451 27.829 29.560 29.298 29.796 28.225 28.537 27.976
Total (19) 518.452 549.849 554.268 535.533 602.737 641.065 686.607 637.682 605.508 632.764Africa’s Growth Trap page 34
Appendix Table A.7
Total agricultural research expenditures (million 1985 PPP dollars)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Botswana 10.839 13.938 11.722 12.366 11.371 12.030 10.941 8.672 8.164 8.639 9.821
Burkina Faso 7.108 7.314 7.578 8.957 10.598 10.648 10.701 10.908 12.649 15.863 19.130
Cote d'Ivoire 39.388 39.063 37.521 34.059 33.053 35.019 35.138 37.084 38.508 39.017 37.607
Ethiopia 21.141 22.085 21.419 25.263 25.441 32.314 50.002 54.007 48.686 49.370 40.530
Ghana 13.544 11.778 9.872 12.642 19.584 28.668 34.082 32.530 33.988 34.514 32.517
Kenya 62.277 64.440 66.230 66.237 65.320 67.659 73.527 80.299 81.105 83.126 95.971
Lesotho 3.490 3.595 3.690 3.810 4.166 2.824 2.975 3.350 3.064 2.714 3.123
Madagascar 11.451 10.655 14.001 17.961 12.548 12.952 14.243 12.581 17.421 16.015 15.627
Malawi 21.954 23.454 26.576 26.697 21.272 24.720 33.383 27.681 28.622 28.199 27.308
Mauritius 9.629 9.307 9.957 11.976 11.600 11.238 10.905 11.033 10.811 10.845 12.625
Niger 8.036 8.130 11.131 10.868 10.812 12.254 11.766 14.812 15.554 11.825 9.829
Nigeria 211.858 188.401 154.023 122.686 110.887 109.054 82.171 93.566 80.981 82.154 86.902
Rwanda 5.765 5.081 5.950 6.214 6.937 10.995 15.354 16.776 19.880 10.086 10.027
Senegal 37.362 30.495 40.385 44.827 59.273 43.246 35.705 34.325 28.567 26.456 23.850
South Africa 141.395 138.201 136.388 151.196 158.625 162.416 156.179 151.839 166.885 158.125 166.194
Sudan 39.903 37.087 33.305 31.504 26.690 23.676 37.308 26.487 22.221 23.288 21.463
Swaziland 3.526 10.870 11.970 10.864 9.571 8.445 8.286 7.165 7.179 5.744 5.885
Zambia 19.815 24.256 23.864 24.747 20.212 18.690 17.866 20.658 20.903 16.947 24.013
Zimbabwe 33.646 32.462 28.774 34.074 35.564 39.813 41.525 41.975 43.196 46.411 43.252
Total (19) 702.127 680.612 654.357 656.946 653.524 666.662 682.059 685.751 688.384 669.338 685.675
Source:International Food Policy Research Institute